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The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of managerial ownership structure, institutional ownership 
structure and audit committee on earnings management with the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners as a moderating variable. The samples in this study are infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) 2009. -2018 6 companies were selected using purposive 
sampling method. The result of the multiple linear regression equation is Y = -0,827 + 0,007 X1 + 0,006 X2 + 
0,121 X3 + 0,032 M + 0,006 X1.M + 0,011 X2.M - 0,675 X3.M. The results showed that ownership structure, 
institutional ownership structure, audit committee and the proportion of independent commissioners did not have 
a significant effect on partial earnings management. Based on the partially moderated regression analysis test, 
the proportion of independent board of commissioners cannot moderate the effect of managerial ownership 
structure on earnings management, the proportion of independent board of commissioners cannot moderate the 
effect of institutional ownership structure on earnings management, the proportion of independent board of 
commissioners cannot moderate the effect of the audit committee on earnings management and simultaneously 
the proportion of independent board of commissioners can moderate the influence of managerial ownership 
structure, institutional ownership structure and audit committee on earnings management. 
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The development of globalization, which increasingly penetrates all aspects of life can 
affect the increase in economic growth in a country which is supported by the development of 
the business world. A company definitely needs additional funds from outside the company for 
the survival of the company. Therefore, there has emerged intense competition between 
companies to survive and be able to compete and attract investors who will provide additional 
funds. Thus, companies are required to show good and healthy performance by providing the 
information desired by investors. One source of information from external parties in assessing 
the performance of a company can be said to be good, it can be seen from the financial sector, 
namely its financial statements (Rahardi and Prastiwi, 2014). 
In the financial statements, an overview of regular accounting results provides 
information about the company's financial position, performance reports and others. The 
financial statements of each company have their respective criteria in accordance with 
established policies. One of the financial reports that has an important role in measuring 
operational performance is the income statement. This profit report is the information needed 
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by shareholders and potential investors to make decisions in investing their funds. Information 
on earnings in financial reports is the main information in making investment decisions. 
However, in reality the earnings information is not always correct, because managers do not 
infrequently misuse it by making changes in the use of accounting methods so that it will affect 
the amount of earnings displayed in financial reports (Wahyuningsih, 2009). The action of 
managers managing earnings information is known as earnings management. Earnings 
management practice is generally defined as an effort by company managers to influence 
information in financial statements with the aim of deceiving stakeholders who want to know 
the company's performance and condition (Mahadewi and Krisnadewi, 2017). 
One way for companies to improve the quality of financial reports and reduce earnings 
management behavior is that companies need to implement good corporate governance or what 
is commonly known as Good Corporate Governance (GCG). GCG is a mechanism developed 
and implemented in a company in order to improve the quality of company performance so 
that it can fulfill investor or public confidence in the company. Several Good Corporate 
Governance mechanisms that can be applied to companies are expected to reduce the level of 
earnings management (Lestari and Murtanto, 2017). 
The main supervisory function given to the audit committee is to oversee the company's 
financial reporting process in order to improve the quality of financial reporting so that the 
audit committee can ensure the protection of the interests of shareholders in relation to financial 
reports. Thus, the audit committee is expected to have the expertise to understand the 
complexities of financial reporting and assess the quality of corporate financial reporting 
(Dwiharyadi, 2017). Bapepam and IDX have issued regulations that require companies listed 
on the IDX to have an audit committee. Based on the BEJ Circular, SE-008 / BEJ / 12-2001, 
the audit committee consists of at least three people including the chairperson of the audit 
committee. The audit committee is one of the GCG components that plays a role in the financial 
reporting system established by the board of commissioners to supervise management 
participation in the financial report reporting process. Pamudji and Trihartati (2010) state that 
the existence of an audit committee is an important tool in the implementation of good 
corporate governance. With this regulation, it is hoped that companies that already have an 
audit committee can avoid earnings management problems. 
In addition to the ownership structure and audit committee, the proportion of independent 
commissioners can also weaken management's motivation to manipulate financial reporting. 
Mahadewi and Krisnadewi (2017) say the independent board of commissioners describes the 
pinnacle of a control system in large companies, which has a dual role, namely the role of 
monitoring and endorsement. Restuningdiah (2011) states that the independent board of 
commissioners is the most important control mechanism. An effective board of directors must 
ensure the validity of the choice of accounting method made by management and the financial 
implications for any decisions made by management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that 
agency theory supports the statement that to increase board independence, outsiders must 
dominate the board because an outside board of commissioners is needed to control and 
supervise management behavior that acts with personal interests. 
Earnings management is interesting to study because it can provide an overview of the 
behavior of managers in reporting their business activities in a certain period, namely the 
existence of certain motivational interests that are reported. The phenomenon of earnings 
management has been around for a long time, namely in large companies, including Enron, 
where the company attempted to manipulate financial reports by inflating its revenues of more 
than US $ 600 million which actually did not exist. In addition, WorldCom, which is one of 
the largest telecommunications companies in America, manipulated financial statements by not 
including the flight of funds of US $ 3.8 billion. This company stated that it booked profit in 
2001, even though the company actually suffered a large loss that year. The phenomenon of 
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earnings management in Indonesia recently happened to PT Garuda Indonesia. On April 1, 
2019 as a public company, Garuda Indonesia reported its 2018 financial performance to the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. In its financial statements, the company with the ticker code GIAA 
managed to earn a net profit of Rp. 11.77 billion, inversely proportional to the condition in 
2017, which lost Rp. 3.15 billion. This performance is quite surprising because in the third 
quarter of 2018 the company still lost IDR 1.67 billion. Two commissioners of Garuda 
Indonesia, Chairul Tanjung and Dony Oskaria refused to sign the 2018 financial report; they 
argued that the impact of the revenue recognition was confusing and misleading. 
 
METHODS 
The location of this research was conducted in companies that are members of the 
infrastructure, utility and transportation sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
from 2009 to 2018. So that researchers only collect data in the form of financial reports and 
other supporting data that have been provided on the Exchange. Indonesian Securities (IDX). 
The period required in this study is 6 months, starting from November 2019 to April 2020. The 
data source used in this study is secondary data obtained from books, journals, laws, and the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange website (www. idx.co.id) and the official website of infrastructure, 
utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
The population in this study were all infrastructure, utility and transportation companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) as many as 77 companies. The sample selection 
in this study using purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling is a sample selection 
technique taking into account predetermined criteria (Rahardi and Prastiwi 2014). The criteria 
for selecting the sample in this study are as follows: (a) infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2009-2018, (b) companies that do 
not report their financial statements for the 2009-2018 period and companies that do not have 
a period financial statements ending in the period 31 December, (c) Companies that do not use 
the rupiah currency in their financial statements, (d) Companies that were delisted during the 
observation period, so that 6 companies were used as research samples, namely: 
 
Table.1 Infrastructure Company 
No. Company Name Company Code Sub-Sector 
 
1. PT Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada Tbk CMNP Jalan tol 
2. PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk GIAA Transportasi 
3. PT Indosat Tbk ISAT Telekomunikasi 
4. PT Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk JSMR Jalan tol 
5. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk PGAS Energi 

















RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Result Analysis of Multiple Linear Regression 




 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -1,736 3,260  -,533 ,596 
SKM ,018 ,033 4,370 ,542 ,590 
SKI ,019 ,033 4,609 ,571 ,570 
KA -,112 ,030 -,458 -3,689 ,001 
PDKI -,006 ,031 -,024 -,196 ,845 
a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management 
Source: Output SPSS (2020) 
 
Based on the unstandardized coefficients (B), it can be seen that the constant and multiple linear 
regression coefficient equation 1 for each variable can be formed so that an equation can be formed as 
follows: 
Y= -1,736 + 0,018 X1 + 0,019 X2 – 0,112 X3 – 0,006 M e 
 







B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -,827 3,411  -,243 ,809 
SKM ,007 ,034 1,709 ,202 ,841 
SKI ,006 ,035 1,512 ,175 ,862 
KA ,121 ,178 ,497 ,680 ,499 
PDKI ,032 ,070 ,128 ,463 ,645 
SKM with PDKI ,006 ,005 ,861 1,189 ,240 
SKI with PDKI ,011 ,008 1,144 1,370 ,177 
KA with PDKI -,675 ,513 -1,705 -1,315 ,194 
a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management 
Source: Output SPSS (2020) 
 
Based on the unstandardized coefficients (B), it can be seen that the constant and multiple linear 
regression coefficients of equation 2 for each variable can be formed so that the following 
equation can be formed: 
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Determination Coeeficient (Test R2) 
Determination Coefficient (R2)  
Summary Model  
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,494a ,244 ,142 ,0588182 
a. Predictors: (Constant), KA with PDKI, SKI, PDKI, KA, SKM 
with PDKI, SKI with PDKI, SKM 
Source: Output SPSS (2020) 
Based on the Adjusted R Square of 0.142, this means that the independent variables in 
the study, namely Managerial Ownership Structure, Institutional Ownership Structure, Audit 
Committee and the Proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners as a moderating 
variable, contribute 14.2% to earnings management in infrastructure companies. utilities and 
transportation listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). While the remaining 85.8% is 
explained by variables outside the model.  
 
Hypothesis Test Results 
In the partial test found in tables 4.10 and 4.11, the information can be explained as follows: 
 
1. The Managerial Ownership Structure (SKM) variable has a significance value of 
0.841 which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that 
Managerial Ownership Structure (SKM) has no significant effect on earnings 
management in infrastructure, utility and transportation listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
2. The Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) variable has a significance value of 
0.862 which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that the 
Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) has no significant effect on earnings 
management in infrastructure, utility and transportation listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
3. The Audit Committee (KA) variable has a significance value of 0.499 which means 
it is above 0.05 (tsig <0.05), so it can be concluded that the Audit Committee (KA) 
has no significant effect on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and 
transportation companies which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
4. The Independent Board of Commissioners (PDKI) proportion variable has a 
significance value of 0.645 which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be 
concluded that the proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners has no 
significant effect on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies which are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
5. Managerial Ownership Structure (SKM) with the Proportion of Independent 
Commissioners (PDKI) as a moderating variable has a significance value of 0.240 
which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that the proportion 
of Independent Commissioners cannot moderate the influence of Managerial 
Ownership Structure on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and 
transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). 
6. The Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) variable with the proportion of the 
Independent Commissioner (PDKI) as a moderating variable has a significance value 
of 0.177 which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that the 
proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners cannot moderate the 
influence of Institutional Ownership Structure on earnings management in 
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infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI). 
7. The Audit Committee (KA) variable with the proportion of the Independent 
Commissioner (PDKI) as a moderating variable has a significance value of 0.194 
which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that the proportion 
of the Independent Commissioners cannot moderate the effect. Audit Committee on 
earnings management in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). 
 
Result of Simultaneously Significant Test (Test F) 
Result of Simultaneously Significant Test (Test F) 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression ,058 7 ,008 2,394 ,034b 
Residual ,180 52 ,003   
Total ,238 59    
a. Dependent Variable: Profit Management 
Source: Output SPSS (2020) 
 
Based on the calculation results, it can be seen that the significance value is 0.034, 
which means that it is below or less than 0.05 (Fsig <0.05) so that it can be stated that the 
proportion of the Independent Commissioner (PDKI) can simultaneously moderate the 
influence of all independent variables which include Structure Managerial Ownership (SKM), 
Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) and the Audit Committee on earnings management in 
infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(BEI). 
Based on the hypothesis test that has been carried out in the t test, it is known the 
magnitude of the influence of each independent variable and the magnitude of the influence of 
the moderating variable, which moderates the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable. The results of the partial test through the t test show that the Managerial 
Ownership Structure (SKM) variable, which is one of the independent variables has a 
significance value of 0.841 which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that 
the managerial ownership structure variable is not has a significant effect on earnings 
management in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange, which means that the hypothesis (H01) is accepted. 
This means that the Managerial Ownership Structure variable has no influence on 
Earning Management. According to agency theory, one mechanism to minimize agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders to be selfish in a company is to maximize the 
amount of managerial ownership. By increasing the number of managerial ownership, 
management will feel the direct impact they take because they become owners of the company 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the results of this study are not in accordance with the 
statement of agency theory. The results of this study are in line with research conducted by 
Asward and Lina (2015) and research conducted by Guna and Herawaty (2010) which states 
that managerial ownership structure has no significant effect on earnings management. 
However, this research is not in line with research conducted by Rahardi and Prastiwi (2014) 
and research conducted by Lestari and Murtanto (2017), which states that managerial 
ownership structure has a significant effect on earnings management. 
 The results of the t test for the Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) variable have a 
significance value of 0.862 which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that 
the institutional ownership structure variable has no significant effect on earnings management 
Muhammad Salman, Nur Kintan Nia 
56 
 
in infrastructure, utility and transportation listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), which 
means the hypothesis (H02) is accepted. 
This means that the Institutional Ownership Structure has no influence on Earnings 
Management. Based on the data from the annual reports of infrastructure, utility and 
transportation companies, it can be seen that the number of institutional ownership tends to be 
small; this makes institutions unable to control management through the monitoring process 
effectively. Institutional ownership usually focuses more on short-term earnings, so managers 
take earnings management actions that can increase the company's short-term earnings. 
According to agency theory, institutional ownership has a very important role in minimizing 
agency conflicts that occur between managers and shareholders. The existence of institutional 
investors is considered capable of being an effective supervisory mechanism in every decision 
taken by managers. This is because institutions are involved in strategic decision-making and 
do not easily believe in managers' actions in manipulating earnings (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). However, the results of this study are not in accordance with the theory statement. The 
results of this study are in line with research conducted by Nazir (2014) and Wahyuningsih 
(2009) which states that institutional ownership structure has no significant effect on earnings 
management. However, the results of this study are not in line with the research conducted by 
Dananjaya and Ardiana (2016) and Abdillah et al (2016) which states that institutional 
ownership structure affects earnings management. 
 The result of the t test for the Audit Committee variable (KA) has a significance value 
of 0.499, which means it is above 0.05 (tsig <0.05), so it can be concluded that the audit 
committee variable has no significant effect on earnings management in listed infrastructure, 
utility and transportation companies, which are registered in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(BEI), which means that the hypothesis (H03) is rejected. 
This means that the Audit Committee has no influence with Earning Management. 
According to agency theory, explaining the existence of an audit committee function within a 
company will provide internal control in the financial reporting system caused by managers, 
thereby minimizing the fraud committed by managers related to earnings management 
practices (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the results of this study are not in accordance 
with the theory. The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Fatmawati 
(2018) and Agustia (2013) which states that the audit committee has no significant effect on 
earnings management. However, the results of this study are not in line with the research 
conducted by Abdillah et al (2016) and Syafa'ah (2017) which states that the audit committee 
has an effect on earnings management. 
The results of the t test show that the variable proportion of independent commissioners 
(PDKI) has a significance value of 0.645, which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be 
concluded that the variable proportion of independent commissioners has no significant effect 
on earnings management in infrastructure companies, utilities and transportation, which are 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), which means the hypothesis (H04) is accepted. 
This means that the proportion of the Independent Commissioner has no influence on 
earnings management. The results showed that the proportion of the board of commissioners 
did not have the ability to control management so that it could not affect earnings management. 
The size of the independent board of commissioners is not the main determining factor of the 
effectiveness of supervision of company management. However, effectiveness depends on the 
norms and beliefs accepted in an organization as well as the role of the independent board of 
commissioners in controlling through the monitoring function of earnings management. 
According to agency theory, it explains that by increasing board independence, it must be 
dominated by outside parties to control and supervise management behavior in manipulating 
earnings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The results of this study are not in accordance with the 
explanation of agency theory. The results of this study are in line with research conducted by 
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Agustia (2013), Syafa'ah (2017) and Wahyuningsih (2009) which states that the proportion of 
independent commissioners has no significant effect on earnings management. However, this 
research is not in line with the research conducted by Abdillah et al (2016) and Ardiyansyah, 
(2014) which states that the proportion of independent commissioners has an effect on earnings 
management. 
The t test results show the variable Managerial Ownership Structure (SKM) with the 
proportion of the Independent Commissioner (PDKI) as the moderating variable has a 
significance value of 0.240 which means above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that 
the proportion of independent commissioners is not can moderate the effect of managerial 
ownership structure on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), which means that the hypothesis 
(H05) is accepted. 
 Based on existing annual report data on infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies, it can be seen that the percentage of the proportion of independent commissioners 
in a company does not comply with the provisions of BAPEPAM No: KEP-315 / BEJ / 07-
2001 which states that every public company must form independent commissioners whose 
members are at least 30% of the total members of the independent commissioners board. With 
this decision, it is possible that the independent board of commissioners is only a formality of 
fulfilling the provisions (Dananjaya and Ardiana, 2016). Apart from that, the managerial 
ownership structure cannot minimize earnings management. 
The results of the t test show that the Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) variable 
with the Proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners (PDKI) as the moderating 
variable has a significance value of 0.177, which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can 
be concluded that the proportion of independent commissioners is not can moderate the effect 
of institutional ownership structure on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and 
transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), which means that the 
hypothesis (H06) is accepted.  
The results of the t test explain that the small percentage of independent commissioners 
in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies is unable to influence management in 
manipulating profits, while shareholders such as institutions cannot place full trust in the 
proportion of independent commissioners because of their existence of the proportion of 
independent commissioners in the company is not large. 
The results of this study are not in line with research conducted by Dananjaya and 
Ardiana (2016), which states that the proportion of independent board of commissioners is able 
to moderate the effect of institutional ownership on earnings management, which explains that 
through its role in carrying out the supervisory function, the composition of the independent 
board of commissioners can influence management in compile financial reports so that a 
quality earnings report can be obtained. 
The t test results show that the Audit Committee (KA) variable with the proportion of 
the Independent Commissioner (PDKI) as the moderating variable has a significance value of 
0.194 which means it is above 0.05 (tsig> 0.05), so it can be concluded that the proportion of 
independent commissioners cannot moderate the effect of the audit committee on earnings 
management in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (BEI), which means that the hypothesis (H07) is accepted. 
 The audit committee is expected to reduce earnings management actions by assisting 
the independent board of commissioners to monitor the financial reporting process carried out 
by management in increasing the credibility of financial reports. However, the results of this 
study indicate that the proportion of independent commissioners and audit committees is still 
insufficient to oversee the management participation process in the financial reporting process 
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that wants to manipulate earnings, so the proportion of independent commissioners cannot 
moderate the effect of the audit committee in this study. 
Based on the hypothesis test that has been carried out in the F test, it can be seen the 
magnitude of the influence of each independent variable and the moderating variable on the 
dependent variable jointly or simultaneously. The results of the F test show a significance value 
of 0.034 which means that it is below or less than 0.05 (Fsig <0.05) so that it can be stated that 
the proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners (PDKI) can simultaneously 
moderate the influence of all independent variables which include Managerial Ownership 
Structure ( SKM), Institutional Ownership Structure (SKI) and the Audit Committee on 
earnings management in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), which means that the hypothesis (H08) is rejected. 
One way to reduce earnings management practices is by increasing the independent board 
of commissioners. The existence of an independent board of commissioners is expected to 
increase supervision with the participation of the audit committee to help carry out the duties 
of the independent board of commissioners so as to improve earnings quality by limiting the 
level of earnings management through the monitoring function of earnings reporting. The more 
the proportion of the independent board of commissioners in the company, the more stringent 
and objective supervision of financial reports will be so that fraud committed by management 
to manipulate profits can be minimized (Dananjaya and Ardiana, 2016). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the results of the analysis, the conclusions of this study are as follows: 
1. Managerial Ownership Structure has no significant effect on earnings management 
in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
2. Institutional Ownership Structure has no significant effect on earnings 
management in infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
3. The Audit Committee has no significant effect on earnings management in 
infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
4. The proportion of the Board of Independent Commissioners has no significant 
effect on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and transportation 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
5. The proportion of the Board of Independent Commissioners cannot moderate the 
influence of Managerial Ownership Structure on earnings management in 
infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
6. The proportion of the Board of Independent Commissioners cannot moderate the 
influence of Institutional Ownership Structure on earnings management in 
infrastructure, utility and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. 
7. The proportion of the Independent Board of Commissioners cannot moderate the 
influence of the Audit Committee on earnings management in infrastructure, utility 
and transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
8. The proportion of the Board of Independent Commissioners moderates the 
influence of Managerial Ownership Structure, Institutional Ownership Structure 
and Audit Committee on earnings management in infrastructure, utility and 
transportation companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
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